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Abstract 
North Korea is still a strictly secluded state and little is known of its past and present though 
recent research using documents from countries in the former Soviet bloc has produced a 
number of breakthroughs especially in the  discussion of the  origins of the Korean War.  
Among others, history of relations between North Korea and Japan is most unexplored. One 
might assume that North Korea has had little interest in developing relations with Japan 
because of the adversary political ideologies between them. Focusing on the early history of 
North Korea, the present paper demonstrates that this assumption is quite wrong. North Korea 
needed the Japanese industrial products and technical know-how from the start of its state 
formation. This gave its leader, Kim Il-sung a good economic reason for establishing official 
relations with Japan. However, in the early period, he had little political power to execute his 
own policy toward Japan. His action had to follow the Soviet grand strategy toward the West. 
By 1961 he achieved a great success in his attempts. This afforded him a promising prospect 
for the military built-up using Japanese products, that is, developments of the nuclear and 
missile programs in the later periods. 
   2 
1.  The Background 
By the end of World War II the northern part of the Korean Peninsula grew into an important 
industrial area in the Japanese Empire. Because of its rich hydraulic and mineral resources, the 
Empire constructed there a wide range of industrial facilities including a large scale of power 
plants and a chemical complex since the 1920s and also steel mills and aluminum refineries 
for military use after starting war against the  US. A large number of Japanese engineers 
worked there while machines and parts were imported from Japan.
1
  To a complete surprise to most Japanese people, Joseph Stalin declared war against Japan 
on 8 August 1945 (Japanese local time). The Red Army invaded Manchuria and Korea from 
the north. By the 20th of the same month the region north of the 38 parallel in the Korean 
Peninsula, the present North Korea, was occupied by the Red Army. To organize a Korean 
communist-led government, Stalin appointed the young Kim Il-sung to its head.    Kim joined 
the anti-Japanese movements near the Korean-Manchurian border in the 1930s.    He then fled 
to East Siberia under Soviet rule, got in custody of the Red Army and eventually was granted 
the Army title of lieutenant. Thereafter Kim earned Stalin’s endorsement as a leader of the 
Korean communists and entered North Korea on 19 September on board a Soviet warship.
   
2
  For the Japanese engineers in North Korea, the sudden end of the war was totally 
unexpected. They stopped operating factories because there was no longer need for the 
production. The Soviet occupation force confiscated all properties of the Japanese, that is, land, 
industrial facilities, shops, homes, valuable personal belongings and others. It dismantled 
some major factories such as aluminum refineries and shipped the equipment to the Soviet 
Union. The dismantling, however, did not last long nor took place on a large scale.  Stalin 
had no intention to wipe out the manufacturing industry from North Korea. On the contrary, he 
thought that it should be an important asset to be used for building a Korean communist nation 
that would have a significant military might and stand against the free world in East Asia. 
Thus the Soviet occupation force and Kim Il-sung, representing Korean communists under its 
guidance, tried to restore the industrial production in North Korea as quickly as possible. For 
this purpose, they kept the Japanese nationals, especially engineers, from returning to Japan. 
Many Japanese engineers agreed to work in the same factories as before and got paid for their 




    The operation of major factories was restored as a result of the mobilization of Japanese 
engineers and Korean workers but never returned to the pre-war levels. There were acute 
shortages of parts and materials while circulation of goods and money were thrown into great 
  They were registered at the Soviet military headquarters in Pyongyang by the order of 
the Commander.      3 
confusion. Under these circumstances, for instance, the Chongjin Iron Works produced iron 
ore in 1947 one-third as much as that in 1944.
4
   The Japanese engineers did not give up returning home. They repeatedly asked the Soviet 
Commander for permission to leave. In the meantime, many Japanese, both engineers and 
non-engineers, fled to the south even on foot or by a small boat chartered privately. As a result, 
the Japanese engineers in North Korea fell substantially in number by 1948. This increased the 
difficulty in restoration of the industrial production. 
   
 
 
2.  Informal Trade Between Japan and North Korea from 1946 till 1956 
After August 1945, formal trade between Japan and the Continent came to a halt. The strong 
demand on the Continent for  Japanese manufactured products, including repair parts for 
maintenance of industrial facilities constructed by Japanese firms before the war, had to be 
met by all means. Against this backdrop, smuggling became rampant. A report of the Japanese 
maritime customs in Kobe Port stated: “Before the war smuggling took place only sporadically, 
on a small scale, conducted by seamen or stevedores but after the war the situation changed 
drastically - it became a well-planned, organizational business.”
5  In 1947-48, 820 cases of 
smuggling between Japan and the Korean Peninsula  were  reported  by the Japanese 
authorities.
6  A major item of smuggling from Japan to North Korea was electrical appliances. 
This smuggling was not totally private business. The Soviet occupation force in North Korea 
set up, jointly with the North Korean administrative body, a trading firm, Choseon Sangsa (the 
Korea Commercial Company), in charge of imports and exports from and to the Soviet Union, 
China, Hong Kong, Japan and other countries in Asia.
7  According to the Japanese intelligence 
service, members of this Company, who were also members of the Communist Party in North 
Korea
8  entered Japan secretly and purchased industrial goods such as bearings and parts of 
generators, medicines, and books on engineering and technology and shipped them to North 
Korea.
9
  On the Japanese side, the Japan Communist Party (hereafter, JCP) was involved deeply in 
smuggling of both men and goods into and out of Japan using chartered small boats, which 
they called People’s Fleet. Korean residents in Japan made up an active part of the Party.
   
10 
They established a close intelligence link with the communists in North Korea and helped the 
members of the Company above and other North Korean agents to fulfill their missions in 
Japan. Principal figures of them were Kim Ch’onhae and Kim T’oyong - both secretly moved 
out of Japan to North Korea between 1947 and 1950.
11  Han Doksu, who later, in 1955, played 
a central role in forming a Korean resident organization in Japan loyal to Kim Il-sung,   4 
Ch’ongryon (General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan), was also among them.     
  In September 1948, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formally created 
in North Korea. Kim Il-sung became head of the state. The Red Army withdrew completely 
from North Korea by the end of that year. Kim Il-sung pushed for strengthening intelligence, 
and activities of North Korean agents in Japan increased. In September 1950 the Japanese 
police arrested a key agent for North Korea. This agent was dispatched by a North Korean 
intelligence agency, the Bureau of Political Safety, to gather information on activities of the 
US occupation force in Japan.
12  In July 1956 the Japanese police arrested another key agent 
for North Korea. He had lived in Japan before the war and joined the proletarian cultural 
movement, together with Kim T’oyong. After the war he crossed to North Korea and worked 
as editor of the organ of the North Korean government, Minju Choson. He wrote a book 
praising Kim Il-sung, The Victorious General, Kim Il-sung and gained his trust. In August 
1953, he made a secret entrance to Japan via Shanghai. His mission was to collect information 
on Japanese politics and economy, focusing on the prospect of commercial relations between 
Japan and North Korea.
13
  In August 1956, a Korean resident in Japan, formerly a JCP member, illicitly shipped the 
following Japanese products to North Korea: transceivers, microscopes, sewing machines for 
industrial use, fishing nets, Manila ropes, wire ropes, drawing instruments and ship’s bottom 
coating. This agent was taken into custody by the Japanese police in the following year.
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3.  Formation of Cocom and the Soviet Bloc’s Response   
The US government provided, on the basis of the Lend Lease Act, a large amount of aid in 
armaments, machines, industrial materials and agricultural products to the Soviet Union 
during WWII, to support Stalin in his war against Hitler.
15  After the war, as the conflict with 
the Soviet Union grew, the  US  changed its policy to  containment  of  the Soviet bloc. In 
1947-48, the US Department of Commerce introduced new export licensing regulations.
16  In 
the following year the US Congress enacted the  Export Control Act.
17  These measures 
intended to ban US  exports  to Eastern Europe and the Soviet  Union  of  materials and 
machinery used for production of armaments and strategically important products such as 
metals, trucks and rails.
18
    Between late 1949 and early 1950, the West secretly established the  Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral  Export  Control  (Cocom) to control exports to the Soviet bloc 
across-the-board. At first the US, Britain, France, Italy and Benelux joined this organization 
and soon afterward Norway, Denmark, Canada and West Germany did. Japan became its 
   5 
member in 1952 when it regained national sovereignty.     
  At the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the US banned, applying the Trading with 
the Enemy Act, all merchandise and financial transactions with North Korea. In October 1951, 
the US Congress passed the so-called Battle Act. This Act forbade the US government to grant 
aid to the countries exporting to the Soviet bloc the products controlled by the US.  West 
European countries wished to expand their exports to the Soviet bloc in order to propel 
economic reconstruction at home. The Battle Act pressed the governments of those countries 
not to engage in such policy.   
  In June 1953, items controlled by Cocom were recorded at 433 in total, of which 263 were 
unconditionally banned of exports, 110 were strictly and 66 were lightly regulated.
19  Further, 
the US had 182 more items on its embargo list targeting the Soviet bloc. This raised the value 
of regulated products as a whole in the world trade substantially, as Adler-Karlsson estimated 
that at less than 5% in 1950 to 30-70% in 1953.
20  As a result, the US exports to the Soviet 
bloc shrank from 693 million dollars in 1947 to 64 million dollars in 1950 and almost to nil in 
1953.
21
  This containment gave a hard blow to the Soviet bloc in gaining power to withstand the West.   
Breaking it became an important diplomatic objective for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 
formed Cominform in October 1947 and under its guidance, organized the World Peace 
Council.
 
22  From Japan Gitaro Hirano and Ikuo Ohyama participated in this Council.
23  Hirano 
was a former associate professor at the University of Tokyo, teaching the Marxian economics 
and was actively involved in political movements in close association with JCP.  Ohyama 
was also very close to JCP, serving before the war as chairman of the Worker-Farmers Party 
controlled by JCP.
24
  The International Economic Conference, after being postponed twice, was held in Moscow 
from 3 till 12 April 1952. Participants reached 471 in all, from 49 countries including the 
Soviet Union, East Europe, Britain, France, West Germany, the US, Japan, India, China and 
North Korea.
  The World Peace Council held its first meeting in East Berlin in February 
1951. At this meeting, the Council appealed to various circles in the West the benefits of 
East-West trade for the world peace and also adopted a proposal to organize a large scale 
meeting, the International Economic Conference, in the Soviet Union scheduled for  the 
summer of the same year. Specifically, this Conference aimed, convening politicians, 
economists, business leaders, engineers and officials of labor unions and cooperative 
organizations worldwide, to discuss issues such as raising the standard of living of peoples 
through “peaceful cooperation” and improving economic relations between nations.   
25  From the US, O. Vickery, chairman of the Association for the Export and 
Import of Chemical Products for Electric Materials, and other 11 people attended, from Britain   6 
25, including Lord Boyd Orr, former secretary general of theFood and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), S. Silverman, Labor MP and D. R. Lorimer, managing director of the 
North British Locomotive Company, and from China 45, Nan Hanchen, Governor of the 
People’s Bank of China and others.
26
  In Japan, Hirano played a leading role in organizing an arrangement committee to send 
delegates to the Conference. Business leaders and politicians such as Shozo Murata, former 
president of Osaka Shosen (the Osaka Mercantile Marine Company) and Tanzan Ishibashi, 
former finance minister joined it.
  From France and Poland attended E. Renault, CEO of 
Renault and O. Lange, a renowned economist, respectively.   
27  As the arrangement proceeded, the Soviet Union offered 
to carry the delegates endorsed by the committee from Tokyo Port to the Russian territory by a 
Russian vessel.
28  However, the conservative government led by Shigeru Yoshida refused to 
issue passports to the delegates. The government shared a common notion with the Western 
conservatives that the Conference aimed at a strategic peace offensive by the Soviet Union.
29 
As a consequence, Tomi Kora, a female legislator alone managed to attend the Conference 
from Japan, entering Moscow via Europe.
30
  North Korea sent a number of delegates to the Conference. During the discussions, they 
strongly condemned the US for its military actions in North Korea, especially accusing it of 
the use of biological weapons.
         
31
Trade between our nation and the capitalist world has almost come to a halt. But it 
would be very difficult to mention names of countries that need foreign trade more 
than [North] Korea. Korea needs a large amount of products of many kinds to 
reconstruct its economy damaged thoroughly by the war. Primary  needs are for 
machines, motors, lathes, railway equipment, wool and wool products, rubber, soy 
beans and medicines. If peace restores, our Republic will be able to export the 
following products: iron ore, magnesite, anthracite, ammonium sulfate, caustic soda, 
rice, maize, apples, carrots, fish and seaweeds. The Korean people know that the 
International Economic Conference will play an important role in reopening 
international trade. The reopening of international trade will contribute greatly to 
peace and more intimate friendly relationships among all nations on earth.
  On the other hand, they urged the need of trade between 
North Korea and the West as follows: 
32
 
   
  Through the almost 10 day itinerary, trade contracts worth 200 million pounds in total were 
concluded mostly between the West and the East, specifically, Britain and France on the one 
hand and the Soviet Union and China on the other.
33  In addition, forming a new trade 
organization, the Association for Promoting International Trade (hereafter, APIT) in each   7 
country was decided.     
  Major Western media was at first suspicious of this Conference. The Times commented on 2 
April:   
One of the main purposes of the conference is presumably to persuade public 
opinion in the West to bring pressure upon their Governments to remove 
restrictions on trade in strategic materials, and generally to contrast the Russian 
liberalism in this respect with the terms of the American Battle Act. 
 
But when the Conference turned out to have produced a substantial result in terms of trade 
contracts, the same paper on 14 April appreciated it: “[w]hatever the propaganda value of the 
conference as such, it was conducted with scrupulous fairness.” 
  For neither Japan nor North Korea the Conference generated any  immediate  tangible 
outcome. However, it marked  a notable event for the  future development of commercial 
relations with each other. At the Conference Tomi Kora got invitation from the Chinese 
delegate, Nan Hanchen to visit China. Dropping in Beijing  on the way back home, she 
concluded a first Japan-China trade agreement after WWII with Nan in the capacity of the 
representative of APIT in China, which was created right after the Conference.
34
  In North Korea APIT was set up in October 1952. Creation of that in Japan was dated in 
1954. For this, industrialists and conservative politicians interested in expansion of trade with 
the East joined hands with leftists such as Hirano. Japan-China Friendship Association, 
organized in 1950 under the strong influence of JCP, gave full support to this attempt.
   
35
 
   
 
4.  Visits of Japanese Leftists to Pyongyang and the Statement of Nam Il   
In October 1953, upon invitation of the North Korean government, Ohyama made a visit to 
Pyongyang officially as the first Japanese citizen, since WWII. He was accompanied by Togo 
Kameda, a JCP member. This visit marked the end of Ohyama’s long journey to communist 
countries. During the journey he attended the General Assembly of the World Peace Council in 
Hungary and further met with Foreign Minister Molotov in the Soviet Union and Prime 
Minister Chou Enlai in China. In Pyongyang he met with Kim Il-sung. Kim expressed to 
Ohyama how highly he respected the Japanese people and Korean residents in Japan fighting 
against the American imperialists and the Japanese reactionary rulers.
36
  In August 1954, Hirano visited North Korea together with Hisao Kuroda.
 
37  Kuroda was 
chairman of the Worker-Farmers Party, a minor leftist party founded by a group of former 
radical members of Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in 1948.
38  This visit was, again, made on the   8 
way back from Europe: Hirano participated in the General Assembly of the World Peace 
Council in Berlin and visited the Soviet Union and China. In Moscow he discussed the issue 
of fish catching in the Sea of Okhotsk with the Soviet bureaucrats. In Pyongyang the agenda 
was commercial relations between Japan and North Korea.
39
  The Japanese government issued passports to the leftists for these trips. It intended to take 
advantage of these opportunities to gather the inside information on the communist world in 
general and the conditions of the Japanese nationals still detained in the Soviet Union and 
China in pa rticular.     
 
  On 22 February 1955 the North Korean government announced, through Radio Pyongyang, 
the following statement of Foreign Minister Nam Il on the issue of relations with Japan: 
The people of DPRK enthusiastically support and root for the Japanese people 
who have established an independent state and are striving for restoring and 
developing normal relations with the Soviet Union, China and other neighboring 
Asian countries... Both the Korean people and the Japanese people who are 
opposed to the war policy [of the Japanese imperialists] ･･･  and wish to 
maintain friendly relations among nations have always had goodwill with each 
other. The government of DPRK ･･･  has been ready to establish normal 
relations with all nations that wish to be friendly with DPRK and has hoped to 
promote commercial and cultural exchanges of mutual interest. The government 
of DPRK welcomes the recent remarks of Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama 
that he is ready to improve economic relations with DPRK and to discuss [this 
issue with DPRK]. We are well prepared to discuss the issues of establishing and 
developing normal relations in trade, culture and others areas between Korea and 
Japan.
40
   
 
The points of this statement are that (a) the Japanese people are distinguished from the 
Japanese imperialists so they can be a counterpart of the North Korean people in developing 
friendly relations and (b) the North Korean government accepts the proposal of Hatoyama for 
creating close, wide-range relations between the two nations.     
  A spokesman for the Japanese government issued the following comment on this statement: 
Up to now, Prime Minister Hatoyama has made no mention of relations with 
North Korea. Therefore, we consider that the statement broadcast this time 
represents another attempt of the peace offensive taking advantage of the 
remarks of Hatoyama made in reference to relations with communist 
countries in general. Political relations with North Korea are very hard to   9 
develop, unlike those with the Soviet Union, because of the fact that Korea is 
divided into the South and the North. In view of the international status of 
North Korea we cannot predict a rapid development of economic and cultural 
relations with North Korea, even though some progress might not be ruled 
out if the case with Communist China is referred to.
 41
 
       
  Thus, the Japanese government denied what Nam Il claimed to be the remark of Hatoyama.   
Further, it expressed an unwillingness to negotiate with North Korea with regard to economic 
and cultural exchanges, let alone improved political relations. It was true that Nam Il distorted 
remarks of Hatoyama. Prior to this, in January 1955, Hatoyama at the press conference 
stressed the need of normalization with the Soviet Union and China and also development of 
commercial relations with them that would be instrumental to it. However, he stopped short of 
making mention of relations with North Korea. Nam Il employed in the statement (a) above 
the same logic as that of Cominform in the peace offensive. The spokesman for the Japanese 
government commented rightly in this respect. On the other hand, the Japanese side gave no 
insight into North Korea’s dire need of the Japanese industrial products and hence restoring 
commercial relations with Japan. 
 
 
5.  The Role of Japanese Leftists in the Development of Economic Relations Between Japan 
and North Korea 
After the war, civil movements for promoting goodwill between Japan and North Korea took 
place in Japan.
42
  Hatanaka lived in Harbin in the 1930s, working for a newspaper company while learning 
Russian.
  In 1951, some Japanese citizens having interest in the  Korean issues 
gathered together with Korean residents in Japan  and set up the Japan-Korea Friendship 
Association. In the following year, JCP took over the leadership of this Association. In 
opposition to JCP, the original members defected so the Association (renamed the Japan-Korea 
Association, JKA hereafter) was almost disintegrated. Rebuilding it was the task of Masaharu 
Hatanaka. 
43  During the war, he stationed in Moscow as a reporter of Asahi Shimbun, a major 
daily newspaper in Japan. He came to be attracted by socialism and after the war, became an 
ardent supporter of the Soviet Union. For this reason, the US occupation force in Japan 
ordered Asahi Shimbun to fire him in 1950, as a case of the so-called red purge. Hatanaka then 
got actively involved in promoting peace movements and cultural and economic exchanges 
between Japan and the communist countries, thus working for the International Communist   10 
Movement. For example, the visit of Ohyama to Pyongyang above was approved by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan after he negotiated with officials of this Ministry. In May 
1955, Hatanaka himself led the Japan Peace Delegates and visited Pyongyang on his way back 
from China. The purpose of this visit was to discuss trade issues with North Korean officials.
44
  In June the same year, right after returning from Pyongyang, Hatanaka assumed office of 
director of JKA. Apparently, a  prior consultation with North Korean officials led to this 
decision. Four months later, in October, JKA held an arrangement meeting for its first national 
convention, which was realized in the following month. Issues of economic and cultural 
exchanges and repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea were discussed in the 
convention. From Pyongyang Korea to JKA were sent a large number of copies of North 
Korean magazines such as New Korea  and  People’s Korea  for free of charge.
   
45
  APIT in Japan created the Committee on Korea as its sub-committee and held the first 
meeting of it in Tokyo on 11 March 1955. This action was a response to two events: the 
announcement of the statement of Nam Il a month before, and the visitation to Japan of 
delegates of APIT in China due toward the end of the same month. APIT in Japan arranged the 
latter event jointly with the League of Parliamentarians for Promoting Trade between Japan 
and China. This League was headed by Shonosuke Ikeda, a Lower House member belonging 
to the Hatoyama faction in the ruling Liberal Party. But it was staffed by leftists, like Kenji 
Matsumoto; he was an activist since the prewar period and had JCP membership.
  JKA 
distributed them to the supporters of North Korea in Japan in return for donation; the sending 
of magazines meant aid to JKA by North Korea. Meanwhile members of JCP provided clerical 
service for local chapters of JKA and JKA faithfully followed the policy of JCP toward Korea. 
Thus, JKA was a “front” organization of the International Communist Movement in Japan that 
specialized in Korean issues.     
46
  Hirano led the Committee on Korea in APIT. Together with Hirano, the director of the 
Tokyo Korean Business Association, a pro-North Korean organization, and staff of trading 
companies such as Toko Bussan, Toyo Menka and Haga Tsusho attended the first meeting of 
that Committee.
  The visit 
of the Chinese delegates aimed to discuss not only the issue of trade between China and Japan 
but that between North Korea and Japan, because they unofficially represented the government 
of North Korea. 
47  Toko Bussan was founded by Ikkan Kawase in 1953.
48  Kawase held 
various posts in the business circle in the prewar period, including the executives of Yokohama 
Rubber Company and the director of the Rubber Control Society. He got familiar with Chinese 
people and culture during his career and held a strong sympathy with China. In 1954 he joined 
in launching APIT in Japan. In the same year Toko Bussan mediated export of Japanese   11 
ammonium sulfate and caustic soda to China, the first of its kind since the war. Toyo Menka 
was a major trading company continuing from the prewar period and Haga Tsusho a company 
specializing in business with China. In the meeting of the Committee on Korea, the director of 
the Tokyo Korean Business Association stated that he would fully cooperate with the 
Committee  to  promote  trade with North Korea. Hirano raised the following issues: (i) 
resolving practical problems such as shipping and settlement, (ii) demanding of the Japanese 
government relaxation of the export control for North Korea and (iii) entrusting APIT in Japan 
and the Beijing Branch of the Korea Trading Company with all trade negotiations between 
Japan and North Korea.
49
  In June 1955, the Committee on Korea decided to send delegates to North Korea. This 
decision was based on the following reports of a member of APIT in Japan, Takeichiro 
Matsuoka (chairman of Matsuoka Sangyo), who had just returned from Pyongyang: (a) North 
Korea shows a keen interest in trade with Japan, (b) it wishes to have Japanese delegates visit 
Pyongyang to conclude a trade agreement and (c) there is no problem with shipment and 
settlement because they can be done indirectly, that is, via China.
   
50
  APIT in Japan dispatched a trade mission to China in September 1955. Staff of trading 
companies interested in trade with North Korea accompanied it.
   
51  Thus, it was a joint mission 
aiming to hold talks with North Korea as well as China. On 15 October, in Beijing, through 
the mediation of APIT in China those companies - Toko Bussan, Wako Koeki and Toho Shokai 
- signed a trade agreement with the Korea Trading Company. The founder of Wako Koeki was 
Shogoro Takahashi, who had worked at Oki Electric Engineering Companiy in Dalien before 
the war.
52  While being detained in China after the war, he was engaged in rebuilding local 
electric and chemical industries. He returned to Japan in 1949 and right after that, at the 
request of Hirano, joined the China-Japan Trade Promotion Society. This Society was 
organized in May 1949 and was working with the assistance of the Korea Business 
Association, an organization under strong influence of JCP. Takahashi at this Society took an 
active part in reopening trade with China. Toho Shokai was set up by Minoru Shiramizu.  
Before the war he took executive office at Toho Shoko, a well-known company for business 
with China. After the war he participated in the creation of APIT in Japan and worked for 
restarting trade with China. Thus, both Wako Koeki and Toho Shokai were founded by those 
who had strong ties with China since the prewar period  and became  leading companies 
specializing in trade with China. The Japanese intelligence agency was watching Toko Bussan, 
Wako Koeki and Toho Shokai as leftist firms. According to its observation, an executive of 
Toko Bussan and an auditor of Wako Koeki had JCP membership.
53
   The trade agreement signed by the three Japanese companies and the North Korean state 
   12 
company above stipulated that each side export products worth 5 million pounds. Listed items 
of exports from Japan were electronics materials such as Nichrome wires, paper, fish nets, 
textiles and medical and other equipment off the list of Cocom, and those from North Korea 
anthracite, red beans and others.
54
  On 19 October 1955, in Pyongyang, the managing director of the Japanese-Soviet Trade 
Association, Minoru Tanabe met with the manager of APIT in North Korea. They signed a 
document, “Minutes on Promotion of Japanese-Korean Trade.” In it North Korea expressed its 
intention to import from Japan such products as steel and non-ferreous metal materials, wire 
ropes, electric cables, machine tools, chemical products and daily necessities.
   
55  The 
Japanese-Soviet Trade Association was established in 1952. The Japanese-Soviet Friendship 
Association, which was organized under leadership of the Soviet Communist Party and JCP, 
set up the Congress of Promoting Japanese-Soviet Trade in 1951 and after the International 
Economic Conference in Moscow adjourned, it was reorganized  into the Japanese-Soviet 
Trade Association. Toko Bussan, Wako Koeki and Toho Shokai were all members of this 
Association. The managing director, Tanabe, was a returnee from a Siberian detention camp.
56 
This may suggest that he was a Soviet agent, like other returnees from Siberia,
57
  On 20 October 1955, Kim Il-sung met with delegates of JSP headed by Sadao Furuya, a diet 
member working for JKA as director. Kim and Furuya discussed relations between the two 
countries, including issues on repatriation of the Japanese nationals detained in North Korea 
and the operation of Japanese fishing boats near the North Korean coast along the Sea of Japan. 
They agreed to make efforts at the normalization of diplomatic relations and mutual economic 
and cultural exchanges, specifically, establishing trade representatives and holding 
merchandise exhibitions.
  charged with 
a mission of promoting trade between Japan and the Soviet bloc. He entered the 
Japanese-Soviet Friendship Association in 1950 and was in charge of the trade promotion 
between Japan and the Soviet Union.           
58
  To these moves toward starting trade with North Korea, the Japanese government responded 
quickly. On 25 October 1955, the cabinet meeting confirmed the ban of economic and cultural 
exchanges with North Korea.
   
59  This contrasted sharply with the policy toward China, because 
at that time the Japanese government did not intervene in the attempts of Japanese private 
organizations to promote trade with China, such as signing agreements, sending delegates and 
holding commercial fairs. Such contrast was caused by different conditions affecting relations 
between Japan and these two countries. First, the international status of the two countries 
differed: up to 1955 no Western countries recognized North Korea while China was already 
recognized by Britain (in 1950). Second, South Korea and the US were strongly opposed to   13 
the Japanese government in making any formal exchange with North Korea. Japan had yet to 
promote talks with South Korea toward normalization of diplomatic and economic relations 
with her. For the Japanese government any move adversary to it would have hampered its 
national interest. Third, North Korea could not be compared to China in terms of capabilities 
of providing natural resources and markets for Japan. Japanese industrialists had little interest 
in t rade w ith N orth  Korea.                    
  In February 1956, Kisuke Miyakoshi, a diet member and the vice-chairman of the trade 
committee in JKA visited North Korea and announced the minutes on promoting 
Japanese-Korean trade.
60  This gave a new stimulus to those who desired to increase the trade 
with North Korea in Japan. In the same month, Tanabe, the  managing director of the 
Japanese-Soviet Trade Association started the Liaison Office for Japanese-Korean Trade.
61  In 
the following month, it developed into the Japanese-Korean Trade Association (JKTA, 
hereafter). About 30 small and medium-sized trading companies doing business with China 
and the Soviet Union became members of it. Riichiro Aikawa was appointed its managing 
director. Aikawa used to work for Ohyama, as secretary, but had no experience with trading 
business.
62
  In June 1956 representatives of Toko Bussan, Toho Shokai, Wako Koeki and another trading 
company visited Pyongyang and concluded a new trade agreement with the Korea Trading 
Company.
  A former activist in the leftist student movement, a graduate from the University 
of Tokyo, entered office. 
63  On this basis, in September, North Korean anthracite was shipped to Japan. The 
Japanese government did not intervene in it this time, because it took the form of Chinese 
trade,  that is, shipping from Dalian Port and settling through Bank of China. Thus, 
Japanese-North Korean trade, unofficial but not illicit, started. In the following month, 
legislators of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party accompanied by members of the 
Worker-Farmers Party met with high-ranking officials of the North Korean government in 
Pyongyang and released a joint communique on trade promotion. In the same month, Japan 
and the Soviet Union issued the joint declaration that marked normalization of the diplomatic 
relations between the two. This gave Kim Il-sung momentum in his attempt to expand trade 
with Japan. He invited a reporter of a major Japanese newspaper,  Yomiuri Shimbun,  to 
Pyongyang and met with him.
64  He expressed this reporter his strong hope that the 
normalization talks would proceed between North Korea and Japan like those between China 
and Japan. Kim also made concrete proposals on improving mutual economic relations, that is, 
an exchange of trade missions and holding of commercial fairs.
65
  In September 1957, Aikawa, the managing director of JKTA, signed with APIT in North 
Korea a trade agreement similar to the former ones.
   
66  He represented JKA, JKTA and APIT in   14 
Japan. 
  In May 1958, in Nagasaki, Japan, a right-wing activist intruded the assembly hall where the 
fair of Chinese products was being held under sponsorship of the Japan-China Friendship 
Association. He hauled down the Chinese national flag displayed there (the so-called Chinese 
National Flag Incident). This Incident developed into a diplomatic conflict between Japan and 
China and caused a halt of trade between the two.
67  The Japanese-North Korean trade via 
Dalian stopped as well. While publicly supporting the Chinese government on this issue as an 
allied nation, the North Korean government worked hard, behind the scene, to resume the 
trade with Japan. APIT in North Korea right after the break of the trade sent telegrams to JKA, 
JKTA and APIT in Japan, asking for detaching this issue from the trade issue.
68
  In January 1959 Kim Il-sung met with Hatanaka who visited Pyongyang via Moscow after 
attending the meeting of the World Peace Council in Helsinki in December 1958. Kim said to 
him: “it is impossible to establish normal relations with Japan now that Japan shows 
unfriendly attitudes to us, but goodwill can be promoted between the peoples without state 
normalization and the same can and must be said about trade.”
  In August, it 
sent telegrams to make the same request. In December, a North Korean trading company 
sought consultation with the Japanese trading companies about resumption of the trade.     
69  Thus, Kim called for 
restarting trade with Japan, shelving political issues. In the following month, APIT in North 
Korea again sent telegrams to the same Japanese organizations as above asking for resuming 
the trade.
70
  In March 1959, Soji Okada, the chief of the International Bureau of JSP visited Pyongyang 
on his return from China. He discussed with North Korean officials the issue on repatriation of 
the Korean people in Japan to North Korea. In the meantime the representatives of APIT in 
North  Korea offered him to conclude a trade agreement. They proposed  to import steel 
products, vessels, trucks, tires, machines, cotton cloths and silk yarn in exchange of iron ores, 
anthracite and graphite.
   
71
  JKTA and JKA, supported by APIT in Japan, launched a nation-wide movement for the 
direct trade with North Korea. They pulled politicians, industrialists and local assemblymen 
into it. In May 1959, together with the Federation of Korean Commerce-industrialists in Japan, 





  As a result, Japanese-North Korean trade restarted, via Hong Kong this 
time, in June the same year. This largely increased the North Korean imports from Japan in 
1959-60 (Table 1).   
   15 
Table 1   
Trade Amounts between North Korea and Japan, 1956-1960 
(thousand yen) 
  North Korea’s imports 
from Japan 
North Korea’s exports to 
Japan 
1956  540  68 
1957  20,175  404 
1958  30  9,935 
1959  73,956  5,916 
1960  409,522  2,910 
Source: Okurasho, Nihon Gaikoku (December 1959, 1960). 
 
  In 1960, JKTA and JKA pushed for the campaign to realize transporting of traded products 
directly between the two countries. In Japan, since 1957, Nobusuke Kishi held premiership. As 
a hawkish anti-communist politician, he took a hard-line policy to the Soviet bloc, showing a 
strong reluctance to promote trade with that bloc. In July 1960 Kishi forced to pass the 
reinforced national security treaty between Japan and the US in the Diet, suppressing the 
strong protest from the leftists secretly aided by the Soviet Union. Amid great confusion, his 
cabinet resigned en masse. Hayato Ikeda succeeded him. Ikeda, a softer conservative, gave a 
first priority in his policy formulation to economic growth so he was less vigilant against the 
International Communist Movement. JKTA and JKA took this opportunity and stepped up 
their campaign. In April 1961, finally, the Ikeda cabinet sanctioned the direct transportation of 
traded products between Japan and North Korea, on the condition that no financial dealing be 
accompanied, that is, imported goods be paid by exported goods of the same value.
73
      
   
 
6.  From Smuggling to Formal Trade: A Hidden Aim of the Peace Offensive   
In his speech at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Korea Workers Party in 1959, 
Kim Il-sung grumbled at the delayed arrival of the imported goods from the Soviet Union and 
East European countries, saying: “We ordered a turning-mill before, spending a large amount 
of foreign currency. But it took 4 years to arrive. If we import 10 turning mills in this way it 
will take 40 years.”
74  Soviet documents confirm this point. In 1954 the Soviet Union 
delivered to North Korea no more than 51% of all equipment for fishing within the contract 
period.
75  In 1957, in the Soviet Union, the Kiev Branch of the Industrial Production Project 
was in charge of the planning of the reconstruction project for the Songjin Iron Works in North 
Korea. Drawing its design was repeatedly overdue because of mal-coordination among the 
Soviet organizations.
76  Thus, the socialist red tape, combined with a long distance between   16 
the Soviet Central and North Korea, caused long delays in arrival of goods and technical 
support at North Korea to the extent that Kim Il-sung got strongly discontent.     
  Kim Il-sung stressed the importance in growth of the military industry since the early period 
in office, as illustrated in the project for expanding the former Japanese arsenal in Pyongyang 
from 1949.
77
  For Kim, Japan had marked advantages over other countries when he would draw foreign 
economic assistance to push for the military-industrial development. First, many engineers 
who had worked in North Korea before the war lived there. They were most knowledgeable 
about the equipment and technology in the North Korean industry. Second, the  Japanese 
economy grew fast since the Korean War, which was a boon for Japanese industry because of 
suddenly increased procurements of the US military in Japan. In this process the introduction 
of Western technology proceeded across-the-board.  Consequently, state-of-art technologies 
could be transferred to North Korea through Japan. Third, Japan adopted a system of 
competitive market economy. The biggest advantage of it from the viewpoint of Kim was 
precise implementation of contracts and assurance of quality of products, which firms in his 
own and allied nations lacked. Fourth, the  very short distance between the two countries 
should reduce transportation costs substantially. Fifth, similarities in culture, language and 
institution would make product arrangements and learning of technology easier. For instance, 
since the frequency employed in North Korea differed from that in the Soviet Union, Soviet 
motors were unfit in North Korea. However, this inconvenience did not occur when Japanese 
motors were used because the same frequency was applied between North Korea and western 
Japan.
  The Songjin Iron Works above, originating in the Joshin Factory of the Japan 
High-frequency Heavy Industry under Japanese rule, was the only plant producing special 
steel  used  for fire arms in North Korea. Therefore, Kim gave it a high priority in the 
reconstruction of North Korean economy after the Korean War.      
78
  Thus, Kim had a  good  economic  reason for approaching Japan. Smuggling had to be 
replaced by licit trade and trade be expanded as rapidly as possible. But in the earlier period, 
Kim had little power in the international scene to act independently. Opening trade with Japan 
was a common objective for the Soviet Union and China as well as North Korea. The peace 
offensive by the Soviet Union served this objective. Kim Il-sung was not a major player in it 
and his approaching Japan took place only within the Soviet grand strategy toward the West, 
as is suggested by the fact that the visits of the Japanese leftists to Pyongyang were connected 
with their journeys t o  the S oviet U nion a nd C hina.         
 
  Since the late 1950s, Kim strengthened his own maneuverability in this sphere. This arose 
from, first, the sharp division of the International Communist Movement due to the   17 
Sino-Soviet Split, second, his succeeding in purging political opponents at home and, third, 
the forming of Ch’ongryon and its increased activities in Japan. The significance of the last 
factor is especially noteworthy. Since its start in 1955, Ch’ongryon functioned as the North 
Korean intelligence agency in Japan, implementing various overt and covert actions upon 
Japanese politicians, propaganda, sabotage, espionage and others, as directed by the North 
Korean government. Among others, procuring the industrial products in Japan and shipping 
them to North Korea became an important function for it from the 1960s on. The North 
Korean missile and nuclear developments could not have proceeded without the contribution 
of Ch’ongryon. This issue needs another discussion elsewhere.
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List of Abbreviations 
APIT     Association for Promoting International Trade 
Ch’ongryon    General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Jae Ilbon Joseon-in Ch’ong 
Ryeon-hoe, in Korean) 
DPRK      Democratic People’s Republic of Korea   
JCP     Japan Communist Party 
JKA        Japan-Korea Association (Nitcho Kyokai, in Japanese) 
JNTA        Japanese-Korean Trade Association (Nitcho Boeki-kai, in Japanese) 
JSP         Japan Socialist Party 
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